agentmemory-persistent-memory
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 8, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPERSISTENCEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFE
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs the user to download and install a third-party package
@agentmemory/agentmemoryvia NPM globally or run it directly usingnpx. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Encourages the execution of unpinned remote code via
npx -y @agentmemory/agentmemory@latest, which bypasses version checks and confirmation prompts. - [PERSISTENCE]: Automatically modifies several AI agent configuration files to ensure the memory plugin or MCP server is loaded in every future session. These include:
~/.claude-code/plugins/agentmemory.json(Claude Code)~/Library/Application Support/Cursor/User/globalStorage/saoudrizwan.claude-dev/settings/cline_mcp_settings.json(Cursor)~/Library/Application Support/Claude/claude_desktop_config.json(Claude Desktop)~/.codex/plugins/agentmemory.js(Codex CLI)- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: Accesses and writes to sensitive application data directories containing user configuration and potentially other authentication settings for popular AI coding environments.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill implements an architecture for capturing and recalling data across sessions which represents an indirect injection attack surface.
- Ingestion points: Captured context from
onFileEdit,onCommand,onDecision, and manualmemory_storecalls inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: None identified in the skill instructions to separate historical memory from current user intent.
- Capability inventory: The skill exposes 51 MCP tools, including capabilities for storing, searching, and deleting memory, as well as graph traversal and code linking in
SKILL.md. - Sanitization: No evidence of input validation, sanitization, or escaping of retrieved memories before they are injected into the agent's prompt context.
Audit Metadata