agents-towards-production
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 8, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The 'Calculator' tool provided in the 'Common Patterns' section uses the Python
eval()function to process input strings. - Evidence:
def calculator(expression: str) -> str: ... return str(eval(expression))in SKILL.md. - Risk: This allows for arbitrary Python code execution if an attacker provides a crafted string to the agent that gets passed into the tool.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill demonstrates how to build agents that ingest untrusted data from various external sources without security guardrails.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the agent context via
tavily.search(web search),vector_store.similarity_search(Redis memory), andcontextual.search(RAG integration) as seen in SKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The prompt templates used in the code examples (e.g.,
web_search_agentandrag_query) lack delimiters or explicit instructions to the model to ignore embedded commands within the retrieved data. - Capability inventory: The agents have the ability to invoke LLMs and execute specialized tools, including the insecure
calculatortool. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of input validation, filtering, or sanitization in the provided code snippets to protect against malicious instructions embedded in the external content.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructions involve cloning a repository and installing several third-party Python packages.
- Evidence:
git clone https://github.com/NirDiamant/agents-towards-production.gitand multiplepip installcommands for libraries likelangchain,langgraph, andredisin SKILL.md. - Risk: These dependencies are fetched from standard public registries (GitHub and PyPI) and are consistent with the skill's stated purpose.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata