pixel-agents-vscode

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 8, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs users to perform command-line operations such as installing the Claude Code CLI and building the extension from source using npm commands. It also manages terminal instances for agent execution.\n- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The extension logic (demonstrated in the watchAgentTranscript function) reads from the sensitive file path .claude/projects/*/transcript.jsonl. This directory contains the internal state and interaction logs of the Claude Code agent, posing a high risk of data exposure as it includes source code modifications and terminal outputs.\n- [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The skill provides a specific user interface option to launch agents with the --dangerously-skip-permissions flag. This action intentionally disables the human-in-the-loop safety mechanism, allowing the AI agent to execute commands and modify files without user confirmation.\n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill guides users to download and install a third-party VS Code extension (pablodelucca.pixel-agents) and clone source code from an external GitHub repository.\n- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection due to its processing of agent transcripts.\n
  • Ingestion points: Reads activity logs from transcript.jsonl in the .claude directory.\n
  • Boundary markers: None identified in the provided logic.\n
  • Capability inventory: Can spawn agents with elevated autonomy via the --dangerously-skip-permissions flag.\n
  • Sanitization: Uses JSON.parse to identify tool names and message types, which then directly trigger UI states and animations without validation of the content's safety.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Oct 8, 2026, 11:39 PM