pixel-agents-vscode
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 8, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs users to perform command-line operations such as installing the Claude Code CLI and building the extension from source using npm commands. It also manages terminal instances for agent execution.\n- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The extension logic (demonstrated in the watchAgentTranscript function) reads from the sensitive file path
.claude/projects/*/transcript.jsonl. This directory contains the internal state and interaction logs of the Claude Code agent, posing a high risk of data exposure as it includes source code modifications and terminal outputs.\n- [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The skill provides a specific user interface option to launch agents with the--dangerously-skip-permissionsflag. This action intentionally disables the human-in-the-loop safety mechanism, allowing the AI agent to execute commands and modify files without user confirmation.\n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill guides users to download and install a third-party VS Code extension (pablodelucca.pixel-agents) and clone source code from an external GitHub repository.\n- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection due to its processing of agent transcripts.\n - Ingestion points: Reads activity logs from
transcript.jsonlin the.claudedirectory.\n - Boundary markers: None identified in the provided logic.\n
- Capability inventory: Can spawn agents with elevated autonomy via the
--dangerously-skip-permissionsflag.\n - Sanitization: Uses
JSON.parseto identify tool names and message types, which then directly trigger UI states and animations without validation of the content's safety.
Audit Metadata