qwen-audio-agent-voice-runtime
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 8, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPERSISTENCEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The skill includes a configuration setting
QWEN_AUDIO_AGENT_BACKEND_PERMISSION_MODEwhich can be set tofull. This mode explicitly auto-approves all commands and file changes initiated by backend agents, removing the 'human-in-the-loop' safety mechanism and allowing for unrestricted system access. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The documentation provides instructions to install the software directly from a GitHub repository (
github.com/QwenAudio/qwen-audio-agent) rather than a verified package registry. Furthermore, the skill features an 'Auto-install' capability for multiple backend agents (such as OpenCode and OpenClaw) from external sources at runtime. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The runtime supports a custom 'ACP Backend' via the
ACP_COMMANDandACP_ARGSconfiguration fields. This allows the skill to execute arbitrary shell commands on the host system as part of its primary operation. - [PERSISTENCE]: The skill provides built-in commands for service management (
qwenaudio gateway install), which installs the gateway as a persistent user service that remains active across system restarts. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits a significant attack surface for indirect prompt injection by ingesting and processing untrusted data from multiple sources.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted content is ingested via voice input, background task results (e.g., web scraping or file analysis performed by backends), and local memory files (
USER.md,frontend-memory.json). - Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify any boundary markers or delimiters to differentiate between user instructions and untrusted data retrieved by backend agents.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses extensive capabilities including arbitrary command execution, file system modification, and network access via its integrated backend protocols.
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of external content before it is interpolated into the agent's prompt or stored in its long-term memory.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata