world2agent-protocol

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 8, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill installs several npm packages and plugins from the machinepulse-ai and quill-io organizations, which are external third-party sources.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Instructions explicitly direct users to execute the Claude CLI with the --dangerously-load-development-channels flag to load plugins, which is a high-risk operation that bypasses safety and stability checks.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on dynamically loading sensors and bridge plugins to function, which executes code from external npm packages at runtime.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and act upon signals from external sources like Hacker News, Reddit, and market data, which can contain malicious instructions.
  • Ingestion points: Signals consumed from HackerNewsSensor, RedditSensor, and arbitrary external API fetches defined in sensor code (SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: No delimiters or boundary markers are shown in the implementation examples to separate untrusted signal data from agent instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The skill documentation suggests capabilities such as writing to local logs via fs.appendFile and triggering external notifications like notifyPagerDuty (SKILL.md).
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, validation, or escaping of the signal data payload before it is processed by the agent.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Oct 8, 2026, 11:39 PM