claude-code-codex-delegation
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 16, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs users to install components by cloning from
https://github.com/skills-directory/skill-codex.git. This source is not a recognized trusted vendor, which constitutes a risk of installing and executing unverifiable external code. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill documentation encourages using the
codexCLI with flags such as--full-autoand--sandbox writable. This configuration allows the external tool to autonomously modify the user's codebase and file system without requiring individual confirmation for each edit. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes repository content as input for the Codex agent, which represents an attack surface where malicious instructions hidden in code could influence the agent's behavior.
- Ingestion points: Entire repository analysis and specific file targeting via
codex execcommands as described inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: Absent. The skill does not provide delimiters or instructions to the agent to treat file content purely as data, leaving it vulnerable to instructions embedded in code or comments.
- Capability inventory: The delegated
codextool has high-privilege access, including the ability to read all files and perform write operations (--sandbox writable) across the repository. - Sanitization: Absent. Codebase content is passed directly to the external AI agent for processing without any sanitization or boundary enforcement.
Audit Metadata