codex-autoresearch-skill
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 16, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONPERSISTENCEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The skill explicitly instructs the user to disable the agent's core security features and safety boundaries.
- Evidence: In the 'Prerequisites for Full Functionality' section, it mandates starting the platform with the flag
--dangerously-bypass-approvals-and-sandbox, which circumvents the security sandbox and removes mandatory user approval for dangerous actions. - [PERSISTENCE]: The skill implements a persistence mechanism by installing and requiring session hooks.
- Evidence: It utilizes
~/.config/codex/hooks/post-session.shto execute logic automatically at the end of every agent session, ensuring the skill's code runs continuously across restarts. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill is distributed from an untrusted third-party repository not associated with verified vendors.
- Evidence: The installation instructions point to
https://github.com/leo-lilinxiao/codex-autoresearchas the primary source for the skill's code. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill is designed to autonomously infer and execute shell commands without human-in-the-loop validation.
- Evidence: The core loop automatically identifies and runs
verify_cmdandguard_cmdstrings based on repository content and natural language goals. When combined with the requested sandbox bypass, this allows for unmonitored arbitrary command execution. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's reliance on 'inferring' configuration from the local environment creates a significant attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Evidence: An attacker could place malicious instructions inside a project file (such as a README, code comment, or configuration file) that the agent reads and treats as a valid shell command to be executed during the iteration loop.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata