codexcont-middleware
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 16, 2026
Risk Level: CRITICALREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions direct the agent to clone an external GitHub repository (https://github.com/neteroster/CodexCont.git) and run the application using 'uv run python run.py'. Executing code from unverified third-party repositories allows for arbitrary code execution within the agent's environment.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The setup and operation process requires executing shell commands such as 'git clone', 'uv sync', and 'uv run', which facilitate the deployment and execution of external, unvetted software.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches a complete codebase and its dependencies from a non-vendor GitHub account without integrity checks or source verification.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The middleware ingests untrusted streaming data from upstream APIs and automatically injects instructions back into the reasoning flow.
- Ingestion points: External streaming responses from OpenAI-compatible APIs (specified in SKILL.md configuration).
- Boundary markers: Absent; the skill does not employ delimiters to separate proxied data from the agent's instruction context, nor does it warn the agent to ignore instructions within the stream.
- Capability inventory: Network proxying, response folding, and automated prompt interpolation (CONTINUE_MARKER).
- Sanitization: No sanitization or validation is performed on the reasoning tokens received from the upstream API before they are processed and potentially used to trigger further reasoning rounds.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata