codexsaver-cost-router
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 16, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs the user to clone source code from an untrusted GitHub repository (
github.com/fendouai/CodexSaver.git) which is not associated with the skill's stated author or recognized trusted organizations. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill facilitates the execution of arbitrary shell commands through the
allowed_commandsparameter in thecodexsaver.delegate_work_packettool. This allows the LLM to run any command provided in the tool call, such aspytest,mypy, or potentially malicious scripts. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: By combining the installation of untrusted code (
pip install -e .) with the ability to execute commands via tool parameters, the skill establishes a high-risk environment for remote code execution. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill requires and handles multiple sensitive API keys (DeepSeek, OpenAI, Anthropic, Gemini, Qwen) stored in environment variables. While it mentions protected paths for
.envfiles, the underlying tool has the capability to access the environment and local file system. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted input from
task_descriptionandgoalparameters and passes them to external worker LLMs without clear boundary markers or sanitization. - Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters via
task_description,goal, andfilesparameters in thedelegate_taskanddelegate_work_packettools (SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: None identified in the provided tool examples.
- Capability inventory: The skill can execute shell commands (
allowed_commands), write to the file system (allowed_files), and perform network operations via worker LLM APIs. - Sanitization: No evidence of input sanitization or filtering before interpolation into worker prompts.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata