seemseam-ccb-multi-agent-cli

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 16, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The installation process involves cloning a repository from an untrusted GitHub source (https://github.com/SeemSeam/claude_codex_bridge.git) and immediately executing shell scripts (./install.sh install) or PowerShell scripts (.\install.ps1 install).
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs the user to download code from an external repository not associated with trusted organizations.
  • [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The Windows installation command uses powershell -ExecutionPolicy Bypass, which explicitly overrides security restrictions designed to prevent the execution of unauthorized scripts.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill facilitates an environment where multiple agents interact via shared memory (.ccb/ccb_memory.md) and delegation commands (/ask). This creates a vulnerability surface where one agent could influence or control another through maliciously crafted data or responses.
  • Ingestion points: Agents read shared context from .ccb/ccb_memory.md and receive queries from other agents via the /ask command.
  • Boundary markers: The skill body provides no evidence of delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands in shared memory.
  • Capability inventory: The framework includes capabilities for subprocess.run (executing the ask utility), git worktree management, and general file system access.
  • Sanitization: There is no documented validation or sanitization of content written to the shared memory file or passed through inter-agent queries.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Sep 16, 2026, 03:57 AM