seemseam-ccb-multi-agent-cli
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 16, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The installation process involves cloning a repository from an untrusted GitHub source (
https://github.com/SeemSeam/claude_codex_bridge.git) and immediately executing shell scripts (./install.sh install) or PowerShell scripts (.\install.ps1 install). - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs the user to download code from an external repository not associated with trusted organizations.
- [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The Windows installation command uses
powershell -ExecutionPolicy Bypass, which explicitly overrides security restrictions designed to prevent the execution of unauthorized scripts. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill facilitates an environment where multiple agents interact via shared memory (
.ccb/ccb_memory.md) and delegation commands (/ask). This creates a vulnerability surface where one agent could influence or control another through maliciously crafted data or responses. - Ingestion points: Agents read shared context from
.ccb/ccb_memory.mdand receive queries from other agents via the/askcommand. - Boundary markers: The skill body provides no evidence of delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands in shared memory.
- Capability inventory: The framework includes capabilities for
subprocess.run(executing theaskutility),git worktreemanagement, and general file system access. - Sanitization: There is no documented validation or sanitization of content written to the shared memory file or passed through inter-agent queries.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata