tradingcodex-investment-workflow
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 16, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The installation instructions utilize
uvxto download and execute code directly from a GitHub repository (monarchjuno/tradingcodex) and a PyPI package (tradingcodex). Executing unverified remote scripts allows for arbitrary code execution on the user's local system. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill requires downloading multiple external components, including the main
tradingcodexpackage and specific broker providers (e.g.,tradingcodex-alpaca), which originate from unverified sources not recognized as trusted organizations. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill implements a local CLI wrapper (
tcx) that executes shell commands for system operations, database management, and starting a local Django server. These commands run within the user's shell environment. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external data, such as news feeds and research markdown files, which are ingested into the context of multiple specialized agents with financial execution capabilities.
- Ingestion points: Research files in the
trading/research/directory and data from external financial APIs. - Boundary markers: The skill relies on "approval gates" but lacks explicit system-level delimiters to prevent agents from following malicious instructions embedded within ingested research artifacts.
- Capability inventory: The agents are authorized to draft financial order tickets and execute commands through the local
tcxwrapper. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of automated sanitization or instruction-filtering for the markdown research content before it is read by the agents.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata