altimate-data-engineering-skills

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 1, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill documentation describes a delegation mechanism that invokes altimate-code run --yolo. The use of a non-interactive/"yolo" flag for executing complex data tasks reduces user oversight and bypasses typical confirmation steps during agent-led operations.
  • Evidence: SKILL.md mentions: Invokes altimate-code run --yolo non-interactively.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill requires the installation of external CLI tools and plugins from GitHub and NPM registries to function correctly.
  • Evidence: Instructions include npm install -g altimate-code, git clone https://github.com/AltimateAI/data-engineering-skills.git, and /plugin install commands for various sub-skills.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses an attack surface for indirect prompt injection by ingesting untrusted external data such as database error messages and query profiles which then influence the agent's file-writing and build actions.
  • Ingestion points: SKILL.md (debugging-dbt-errors skill reads full error messages; optimizing-query-by-id retrieves query profiles).
  • Boundary markers: None explicitly defined in the provided instruction set to delimit external data from agent instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The skill can write files (creating dbt models), execute shell commands (dbt build, dbt show), and delegate to the altimate-code CLI.
  • Sanitization: No sanitization or validation logic is mentioned for the external error messages or query data before processing.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Oct 1, 2026, 01:34 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — altimate-data-engineering-skills