options-analytics-agent-langgraph
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 1, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill architecture involves ingesting data from external financial APIs and web search providers, which constitutes a potential vector for indirect prompt injection if those sources return malicious content.
- Ingestion points: Polygon.io options data and Tavily search results.
- Boundary markers: The provided instructions do not explicitly include specific delimiters or sanitization steps to isolate external data from instructions.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the ability to write to the file system via the CSVExportTool and maintain persistent state in ChromaDB and SQLite databases.
- Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or filtering of external API data is described in the core tool implementation snippets.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The troubleshooting documentation includes code snippets that perform destructive file operations to reset the environment.
- Evidence: Python snippets using shutil.rmtree to delete the ChromaDB persistence directory and os.remove to clear the conversation memory database in the Troubleshooting section.
Audit Metadata