claude-design-premium-harness
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 16, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The installation process involves downloading a ZIP archive from a third-party, untrusted GitHub repository at
https://github.com/oalanicolas/claude-design-premium/archive/refs/heads/main.zip. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill requires the execution of multiple Node.js scripts (
bootstrap-harness.mjs,context-signals.mjs,test-builder-bootstrap.mjs) included in the downloaded archive to perform setup and validation tasks. Executing downloaded code from an unverified source is a significant security risk. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides instructions for the agent to execute shell commands such as
curl,unzip, andnodeto install and run the harness. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes external files that could contain malicious instructions designed to manipulate agent behavior.
- Ingestion points: Files like
DESIGN.md,_ds_manifest.json, andBOUND_DS.jsonare read and interpreted to set design constraints and component rules. - Boundary markers: The skill lacks explicit boundary markers or "ignore instructions" warnings when processing the contents of these configuration files.
- Capability inventory: The skill scripts possess file system access (read/write) and shell execution capabilities, which could be abused if malicious data is ingested.
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation for the natural language rules or component definitions read from external files.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata