claude-design-premium-harness

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 16, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The installation process involves downloading a ZIP archive from a third-party, untrusted GitHub repository at https://github.com/oalanicolas/claude-design-premium/archive/refs/heads/main.zip.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill requires the execution of multiple Node.js scripts (bootstrap-harness.mjs, context-signals.mjs, test-builder-bootstrap.mjs) included in the downloaded archive to perform setup and validation tasks. Executing downloaded code from an unverified source is a significant security risk.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides instructions for the agent to execute shell commands such as curl, unzip, and node to install and run the harness.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes external files that could contain malicious instructions designed to manipulate agent behavior.
  • Ingestion points: Files like DESIGN.md, _ds_manifest.json, and BOUND_DS.json are read and interpreted to set design constraints and component rules.
  • Boundary markers: The skill lacks explicit boundary markers or "ignore instructions" warnings when processing the contents of these configuration files.
  • Capability inventory: The skill scripts possess file system access (read/write) and shell execution capabilities, which could be abused if malicious data is ingested.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation for the natural language rules or component definitions read from external files.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Sep 16, 2026, 03:57 AM