design-os-product-planning
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 16, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs the user to download a remote repository from
https://github.com/buildermethods/design-os.git. This external source is not affiliated with the stated author of the skill and originates from an unverified third party.- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The documentation guides the user to perform agit clonefollowed bynpm installandnpm run dev. This sequence facilitates the execution of arbitrary remote code from an untrusted external repository.- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Multiple shell commands are utilized to set up the environment and run the application, includinggit clone,npm install,bun install,npm run dev,npm run build, andnpm start.- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: - Ingestion points: The skill ingests and processes untrusted data defining product entities, section specifications, and feature requirements provided by the user or defined in the skill documentation.
- Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters or instructions provided to the agent to disregard potential instructions embedded within the data models or product specifications.
- Capability inventory: The skill environment supports shell command execution (
npm,git,bun) and outbound network requests to AI service providers. - Sanitization: The documentation does not specify any sanitization or validation mechanisms to filter malicious content from the design specifications before they are processed by the tool or the AI.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata