designpowers-agent-team
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 16, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill documentation instructs users to download a plugin from an unverified external source (
github.com/Owl-Listener/designpowers.git) that is not identified as a trusted organization or well-known service. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: By following the installation steps to link or add the cloned repository as a plugin in tools like Claude Code or Gemini CLI, the agent is directed to execute external code in its runtime. The skill also relies on a custom
designpowersCLI tool provided by this external source. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill's documented workflow involves several shell commands for installation and operation, including
git clone,claude plugin link, and the execution of thedesignpowersbuild and review commands. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external data, which provides a vulnerability surface for indirect prompt injection. 1. Ingestion points: The Review Lane accepts external URLs, screenshots, and code snippets for auditing. 2. Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify any delimiters or safety warnings to distinguish external data from agent commands. 3. Capability inventory: The skill possesses capabilities for shell execution, network access, and file system modification. 4. Sanitization: There are no documented procedures for sanitizing or validating the content retrieved from external sources during the audit process.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata