figma-mcp-go-design-automation
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 16, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill configuration directs the agent to run the MCP server using
npx -y @vkhanhqui/figma-mcp-go@latest, which downloads and executes external code from the npm registry at runtime. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The instructions require users to download a
plugin.zipfile from an external GitHub repository (github.com/vkhanhqui/figma-mcp-go/releases) and install it locally to enable the Figma plugin bridge. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses a vulnerability surface for indirect prompt injection by reading untrusted data from Figma files.
- Ingestion points: Tools such as
get_document,get_selection, andscan_text_nodespull design content and text metadata into the agent context. - Boundary markers: The skill does not define specific delimiters or instructions to prevent the agent from following directives embedded in the design content.
- Capability inventory: The skill has full write access to the Figma file environment and can write files (PDFs, images, tokens) to the host file system.
- Sanitization: Content retrieved from Figma is processed without documented validation, filtering, or sanitization to remove potential malicious instructions.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Tools including
save_screenshotsandexport_frames_to_pdfallow the agent to write files to arbitrary local paths provided as parameters.
Audit Metadata