solidworks-design-vault-cad
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 16, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs users to clone a repository from a source not recognized as a trusted organization (
github.com/fgiafrica/SolidWork-Design-Vault). - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Includes instructions to execute shell commands for repository cloning and provides Python examples using
subprocess.runto invoke local system binaries likeswScheduler.exe. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: Provides scripts utilizing powerful automation interfaces, including the Windows COM bridge (
win32com.client), SolidWorks VBA macros, and C# code execution within Node.js environments via theedge-jslibrary. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exposes an attack surface by processing external CAD files while maintaining high-privilege automation capabilities.
- Ingestion points: The skill is designed to load and process
.SLDPRT,.SLDASM, and.SLDDRWfiles from external sources. - Boundary markers: No explicit boundary markers or safety instructions are provided to the agent regarding untrusted CAD metadata.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes subprocess execution, COM automation, and dynamic C# execution.
- Sanitization: There are no apparent validation or sanitization checks in the provided script templates to handle malformed or malicious CAD file metadata.
Audit Metadata