breathe-cli-resonance-breathing
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 8, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPERSISTENCEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill provides instructions to download the
breathe.pyscript directly from a personal GitHub repository (marekkowalczyk/breathe-cli) that is not a recognized trusted vendor or well-known service. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The installation process involves downloading a Python script and immediately executing it (
curl -O ... && ./breathe.py), which constitutes the execution of remote code from an unverified source. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill documentation describes using
subprocess.runto call thebreathecommand-line tool within Python scripts. It also suggests integration with system tools liketerminal-notifierandafplayvia the command line. - [PERSISTENCE]: The documentation provides specific instructions for creating a
crontabentry to schedule daily reminders, which is a standard method for establishing persistence on a system. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection due to how it handles session parameters.
- Ingestion points: User-provided inputs for parameters like
--durationand--ratioare interpolated into shell commands in the provided examples (SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: There are no boundary markers or instructions to ignore embedded commands within these input fields.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to execute shell commands, perform network downloads, and write to the file system for logging purposes.
- Sanitization: There is no mention of input sanitization or validation of these arguments before they are passed to the shell.
Audit Metadata