cc-switch-cli

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 8, 2026

Risk Level: CRITICALREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill provides instructions to install software by piping a remote shell script directly into bash. This is a high-risk pattern that allows for arbitrary code execution without prior inspection.
  • Evidence: curl -fsSL https://github.com/SaladDay/cc-switch-cli/releases/latest/download/install.sh | bash in SKILL.md.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill downloads binaries and scripts from a GitHub repository (SaladDay/cc-switch-cli) that is not associated with a known trusted organization or the skill's authoring vendor.
  • Evidence: Multiple curl -LO and curl -fsSL commands targeting github.com/SaladDay/cc-switch-cli/releases.
  • [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: Manual installation and build instructions require the use of sudo to move or copy binaries into system directories, which grants the process administrative rights over the host system.
  • Evidence: sudo mv cc-switch /usr/local/bin/ and sudo cp target/release/cc-switch /usr/local/bin/ in SKILL.md.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill facilitates the execution of various system commands, including xattr to remove security attributes and chmod to modify file permissions.
  • Evidence: chmod +x cc-switch and xattr -cr /usr/local/bin/cc-switch in SKILL.md.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses a broad attack surface for indirect injection as it ingests data from external API providers, MCP servers, and community repositories while having the capability to modify critical agent configuration files.
  • Ingestion points: Community skills discovered via cc-switch skills discover and remote provider model lists fetched via cc-switch provider fetch-models.
  • Boundary markers: None present; the instructions do not include delimiters or warnings for the agent to ignore instructions embedded in the external content it processes.
  • Capability inventory: The skill can write to filesystem paths (e.g., ~/.claude/CLAUDE.md), execute shell commands via mcp validate, and perform network operations via curl and proxy start.
  • Sanitization: No evidence of sanitization or validation of content fetched from remote skills or providers before it is synced to the agent's active configuration files.
Recommendations
  • HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://github.com/SaladDay/cc-switch-cli/releases/latest/download/install.sh - DO NOT USE without thorough review
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
CRITICAL
Analyzed
Oct 8, 2026, 11:44 PM