chronosforge-temporal-email-cli
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 8, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructions direct the agent to download a pre-built binary from a personal GitHub repository (
randyfajar/inbox-watcher-cli). - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The installation guide and GitHub Actions examples encourage fetching a remote binary via
wgetand executing it after applyingchmod +x. This pattern allows for the execution of arbitrary code from an unknown source. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The provided Python, Node.js, and Bash examples demonstrate the use of
subprocess.run,child_process.exec, and shell piping to execute the downloadedchronosforgebinary with various arguments. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]:
- Ingestion points: The skill is designed to monitor and extract data from external temporary email inboxes (
SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or boundary markers are defined to help the agent distinguish between instructions and untrusted email content.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses capabilities for shell execution, file system interaction via CLI, and network requests (
curl). - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of the email content before it is parsed and used in automation workflows.
- [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The integration examples for GitHub Actions include the use of
sudoto move the downloaded binary into a protected system directory (/usr/local/bin/), which involves acquiring administrative permissions.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata