cli-continues-session-transfer
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 8, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from multiple coding tool session histories and injects them into a new AI assistant context.
- Ingestion points: Reads data from numerous local directories including
~/.claude/,~/.cursor/, and VS Code globalStorage paths. - Boundary markers: The handoff document structure lacks explicit boundary markers or instructions to the target agent to treat the imported history as untrusted content.
- Capability inventory: The target tools (Claude Code, Cursor, etc.) have broad system access, including shell execution and file system writes.
- Sanitization: Documentation notes that API keys in session history are preserved as-is, requiring manual user sanitization.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill reads from directories that contain sensitive project history and potentially private information.
- Sensitive paths: Specifically targets
~/.claude/,~/.cursor/,~/.codex/,~/.gemini/,~/.copilot/, and others. - Exposure risk: These logs typically contain full source code, command execution output, and reasoning steps that may include sensitive project details or hardcoded secrets found during the development process.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill is distributed as a Node.js package, with instructions to fetch and execute it via
npx continuesornpm install -g continuesfrom the public npm registry. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Operation of the skill relies on executing the
continuesCLI tool to perform scanning, listing, and session extraction tasks.
Audit Metadata