cli-continues-session-transfer

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 8, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from multiple coding tool session histories and injects them into a new AI assistant context.
  • Ingestion points: Reads data from numerous local directories including ~/.claude/, ~/.cursor/, and VS Code globalStorage paths.
  • Boundary markers: The handoff document structure lacks explicit boundary markers or instructions to the target agent to treat the imported history as untrusted content.
  • Capability inventory: The target tools (Claude Code, Cursor, etc.) have broad system access, including shell execution and file system writes.
  • Sanitization: Documentation notes that API keys in session history are preserved as-is, requiring manual user sanitization.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill reads from directories that contain sensitive project history and potentially private information.
  • Sensitive paths: Specifically targets ~/.claude/, ~/.cursor/, ~/.codex/, ~/.gemini/, ~/.copilot/, and others.
  • Exposure risk: These logs typically contain full source code, command execution output, and reasoning steps that may include sensitive project details or hardcoded secrets found during the development process.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill is distributed as a Node.js package, with instructions to fetch and execute it via npx continues or npm install -g continues from the public npm registry.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Operation of the skill relies on executing the continues CLI tool to perform scanning, listing, and session extraction tasks.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 8, 2026, 11:44 PM