cli-printing-press-generator
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 8, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs the user to download and install a compiled binary from an external GitHub repository (
github.com/mvanhorn/cli-printing-press) using thego installcommand. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The installation process involves running shell commands (
go install,git clone,git pull) to fetch and execute code from sources outside the vendor's own infrastructure. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill is designed to autonomously generate Go code, compile it, and then execute it during its "Verification" and "Dogfood" phases. This process involves running
exec.Commandon dynamically created binaries. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external data—such as URLs, third-party API documentation, and "browser-sniffed" network traffic—to drive its autonomous code generation workflow.
- Ingestion points: Inputs to the
/printing-press <url>command and automated web research phases (File: SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: The instructions lack explicit directives for the agent to ignore or sanitize malicious instructions that might be embedded within targeted API specifications or captured web traffic.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to write files, compile Go code, and execute subprocesses (
exec.Command) to test the generated output (File: SKILL.md). - Sanitization: There are no mentioned mechanisms for sanitizing or escaping content retrieved from external URLs before it is interpolated into the code generation pipeline.
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