cli-printing-press-generator

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 8, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs the user to download and install a compiled binary from an external GitHub repository (github.com/mvanhorn/cli-printing-press) using the go install command.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The installation process involves running shell commands (go install, git clone, git pull) to fetch and execute code from sources outside the vendor's own infrastructure.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill is designed to autonomously generate Go code, compile it, and then execute it during its "Verification" and "Dogfood" phases. This process involves running exec.Command on dynamically created binaries.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external data—such as URLs, third-party API documentation, and "browser-sniffed" network traffic—to drive its autonomous code generation workflow.
  • Ingestion points: Inputs to the /printing-press <url> command and automated web research phases (File: SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: The instructions lack explicit directives for the agent to ignore or sanitize malicious instructions that might be embedded within targeted API specifications or captured web traffic.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to write files, compile Go code, and execute subprocesses (exec.Command) to test the generated output (File: SKILL.md).
  • Sanitization: There are no mentioned mechanisms for sanitizing or escaping content retrieved from external URLs before it is interpolated into the code generation pipeline.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Oct 8, 2026, 11:44 PM