continues-ai-session-transfer
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 8, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs the user to install and run the
continuespackage from the NPM registry usingnpx continuesornpm install -g continues. This package is an external dependency from a source not recognized as a trusted vendor. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on executing the
continuesCLI tool to perform session discovery, indexing, and handoff operations, which involves running shell commands on the host system. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses highly sensitive local directories to extract session history, including conversation logs and shell command outputs. Impacted paths include
~/.claude,~/.cursor,~/.gemini,~/.copilot, and VS Code global storage paths. While this is the core function of the skill, it exposes private development history and terminal data. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from session files across 16+ tools and interpolates the content into "handoff documents" used as prompts for other AI agents.
- Ingestion points: Local session storage files such as
session.jsonl,sessions.db, and chat history JSON files from various coding assistants. - Boundary markers: None mentioned; the generated handoff markdown is intended to be parsed and followed by the target AI agent without explicit isolation.
- Capability inventory: File system read access across user home directories and potential execution of target tools via shell command wrappers.
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of the content extracted from source sessions before it is passed to the next agent.
Audit Metadata