continues-ai-session-transfer

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 8, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs the user to install and run the continues package from the NPM registry using npx continues or npm install -g continues. This package is an external dependency from a source not recognized as a trusted vendor.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on executing the continues CLI tool to perform session discovery, indexing, and handoff operations, which involves running shell commands on the host system.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses highly sensitive local directories to extract session history, including conversation logs and shell command outputs. Impacted paths include ~/.claude, ~/.cursor, ~/.gemini, ~/.copilot, and VS Code global storage paths. While this is the core function of the skill, it exposes private development history and terminal data.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from session files across 16+ tools and interpolates the content into "handoff documents" used as prompts for other AI agents.
  • Ingestion points: Local session storage files such as session.jsonl, sessions.db, and chat history JSON files from various coding assistants.
  • Boundary markers: None mentioned; the generated handoff markdown is intended to be parsed and followed by the target AI agent without explicit isolation.
  • Capability inventory: File system read access across user home directories and potential execution of target tools via shell command wrappers.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of the content extracted from source sessions before it is passed to the next agent.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Oct 8, 2026, 11:44 PM