fastcopy-file-transfer-optimizer
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 8, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONPERSISTENCEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The installation instructions for macOS explicitly direct the agent to download a package from an external domain (
example.com). - [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: Multiple sections of the skill instruct the use of
sudofor installation and execution, includingsudo installer,sudo dpkg -i,sudo make install, andsudo fastcopy, granting elevated administrative permissions to these processes. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill defines a YAML profile schema that supports lifecycle hooks (
on_start,on_complete,on_error) which execute arbitrary shell commands provided as strings. - [PERSISTENCE]: The configuration format includes support for
crontype scheduling (e.g.,expression: "0 2 * * *"), which can be used to set up recurring, persistent execution of tasks on the host system. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The installation workflow for macOS combines an external download with immediate execution via the
installerutility with root privileges. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill provides a surface for indirect injection by processing YAML configuration files that can contain malicious shell hooks.
- Ingestion points: YAML profile files like
transfer-profile.yamlandscheduled-backup.yamlreferenced inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define delimiters or warnings to prevent the agent from blindly executing hooks found in untrusted configuration files.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to execute shell commands, send emails (
mail), and interact with the filesystem across platforms. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation of the shell commands defined in the profile hooks before they are passed to the system shell.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata