nebulavault-media-downloader
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 8, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructions direct users to download binary releases and clone source code from an untrusted third-party GitHub repository (Ronish17/redbull-archive-cli) instead of the vendor's own infrastructure.
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The installation process involves downloading a pre-compiled binary (nebulavault-linux-x64.tar.gz) and executing it locally, which allows for the execution of unverified code.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The post-processing feature in the configuration settings allows the definition of shell commands (e.g., using ffmpeg) that interpolate variables like {input}. This presents a command injection surface if media filenames or associated metadata are manipulated by an attacker.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill includes a plugin system that allows loading and executing arbitrary JavaScript files from the local filesystem, which can be leveraged to run malicious logic within the Node.js or Deno environment.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from external sources, including RSS feeds and streaming URLs.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the system via the
feed addcommand and media metadata extraction during downloads. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit instructions or delimiters to prevent the agent from following instructions embedded in the processed metadata or RSS content.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses extensive capabilities including file system writes, network access, and shell command execution via post-processing.
- Sanitization: No evidence of sanitization or validation is provided for data retrieved from external feeds or media streams before it is used in further operations.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata