sigcli-auth-proxy
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 8, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill requires the installation of the
@sigcli/clipackage from the NPM registry to function. While this is a standard dependency for the tool, it introduces a supply chain dependency on the@sigcliscope. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill facilitates the execution of arbitrary commands through
sig run, which injects authentication credentials into the subprocess environment. This is a core feature but allows the agent to execute shell commands with elevated API access. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The configuration format supports a
validateRulefield, which executes JavaScript expressions at runtime. These expressions are evaluated against data received from external HTTP responses (res.body,res.status). This allows for dynamic code execution triggered by external server content. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from external websites and APIs through
sig proxyandsig request. There is a risk that maliciously crafted responses (e.g., hidden instructions in JSON or HTML comments) could be passed to the AI agent's context. The analysis found: - Ingestion points: Data enters via
sig requestoutput andsig proxytraffic interception. - Boundary markers: None identified in the prompt templates to distinguish between authenticated data and instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to write to the file system (
sig init), execute shell commands (sig run), and perform network operations (sig request). - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or filtering of external content is mentioned before the data is returned to the agent.
Audit Metadata