tartarusai-cli-coding-agent

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 8, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONPERSISTENCE
Full Analysis
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to download executable binaries from an external GitHub repository (Tartarus-AI) and run them directly. This provides a direct path for executing arbitrary code from a source that is not a recognized trusted vendor.
  • Evidence: curl -L -o tartarusai-cli https://github.com/Tartarus-AI/tartarusai-cli/releases/latest/download/tartarusai-cli-linux-x64 in SKILL.md.
  • Evidence: Invoke-WebRequest https://github.com/Tartarus-AI/tartarusai-cli/releases/latest/download/tartarusai-cli-windows-x64.exe in SKILL.md.
  • [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The installation instructions require the use of sudo to move an untrusted binary into a system-wide executable path, potentially granting the external binary root-level access or the ability to affect all users on the system.
  • Evidence: sudo mv tartarusai-cli /usr/local/bin/ in SKILL.md.
  • [PERSISTENCE]: By moving the binary to /usr/local/bin/ or adding it to the system PATH, the skill establishes a persistent presence on the host machine that survives reboots and session restarts.
  • Evidence: Installation steps in the Linux and Windows sections of SKILL.md.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest large amounts of local code and data (up to 256K tokens) to be processed by an external AI model, creating a surface where malicious instructions hidden in the codebase could influence agent behavior.
  • Ingestion points: Local repository files and context files created via cat (specified in SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: None provided to separate instructions from the ingested code content.
  • Capability inventory: Shell command execution (installation), network access (CLI communication), and local file reads.
  • Sanitization: No sanitization of ingested file content is performed before passing it to the agent context.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Oct 8, 2026, 11:44 PM