awesome-openclaw-agents-templates
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 12, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs the user and agent to fetch content from an unverified third-party repository:
https://github.com/mergisi/awesome-openclaw-agents.git. This source is not recognized as a trusted organization or well-known service. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The documentation provides a workflow to
git clonethe external repository, performnpm installto download dependencies, and then execute the code usingnode bot.js. This creates a pattern where code from an unknown source is downloaded and executed locally. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill architecture ingests
SOUL.mdfiles as untrusted data and interpolates them directly into the LLM system prompt. - Ingestion points: External configuration files (
SOUL.md) are read viafs.readFileSyncinSKILL.md(code examples). - Boundary markers: Absent; the content is passed directly as the
systemrole content. - Capability inventory: The agents described have access to OpenAI API calls, file system writes (
fs.writeFileSync), and subprocess spawning. - Sanitization: None; the content is used verbatim, allowing embedded instructions in a
SOUL.mdfile to potentially override the agent's behavior. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill includes code snippets for a 'multi-agent setup' that uses
child_process.spawnto dynamically launch new Node.js processes based on file paths defined in an array.
Audit Metadata