hermes-browser-extension

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 12, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs the agent or user to clone a source code repository from a non-trusted GitHub account: https://github.com/abundantbeing/hermes-browser-extension.git.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The installation workflow involves running npm install and npm run build on the downloaded repository. This executes arbitrary build scripts and installs dependencies defined by a third party, which can lead to code execution from an unverified source.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The extension captures active tab context (titles, URLs, readable text, headings, and metadata) and sends it to the Hermes Agent. This provides a vector for malicious instructions embedded in web pages to influence the agent's behavior.
  • Ingestion points: Content is scraped from active browser tabs via a content script and transmitted through the extension's side panel (SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: The documentation states that page text is "marked as external context" to mitigate accidental obedience, though this does not fully prevent adversarial injection.
  • Capability inventory: The captured data is sent to the Hermes Gateway/API, which may have access to tools, sessions, and memory across multiple skills.
  • Sanitization: There is no explicit description of sanitization, filtering, or validation of the captured web content before it is processed by the AI.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill requires manual shell command execution for setup and verification, including hermes gateway run and cat dist/manifest.json | grep version.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Sep 12, 2026, 06:49 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — hermes-browser-extension