hermes-lcm-context-management
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 12, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs the user to download code from a third-party repository not associated with trusted organizations.
- URL:
https://github.com/stephenschoettler/hermes-lcm - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill facilitates the execution of external code on the host system through the installation and update workflows.
- Pattern:
https://github.com/stephenschoettler/hermes-lcm→git cloneinto plugins directory followed by execution of./scripts/install.shor./scripts/update.sh. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses shell commands to manage its lifecycle and perform maintenance tasks.
- Commands: Execution of
./scripts/install.sh,./scripts/update.sh, and thelcm_doctortool which supports destructive cleanup operations whenLCM_DOCTOR_CLEAN_APPLY_ENABLEDis set to true. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill features a context recovery mechanism that is susceptible to indirect prompt injection from historical data.
- Ingestion points: Tools such as
lcm_grep,lcm_expand, andlcm_expand_queryingest data from a local SQLite database (lcm.db) containing prior conversation logs. - Boundary markers: None. The skill does not define delimiters or provide instructions to the agent to ignore potentially malicious instructions embedded in the retrieved historical context.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to write to the file system (externalized payloads), modify the SQLite database, and invoke an auxiliary LLM for synthesis.
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of content sanitization or escaping of the historical data before it is re-interpolated into the agent's active context.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata