hermes-lcm-context-management

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 12, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs the user to download code from a third-party repository not associated with trusted organizations.
  • URL: https://github.com/stephenschoettler/hermes-lcm
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill facilitates the execution of external code on the host system through the installation and update workflows.
  • Pattern: https://github.com/stephenschoettler/hermes-lcmgit clone into plugins directory followed by execution of ./scripts/install.sh or ./scripts/update.sh.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses shell commands to manage its lifecycle and perform maintenance tasks.
  • Commands: Execution of ./scripts/install.sh, ./scripts/update.sh, and the lcm_doctor tool which supports destructive cleanup operations when LCM_DOCTOR_CLEAN_APPLY_ENABLED is set to true.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill features a context recovery mechanism that is susceptible to indirect prompt injection from historical data.
  • Ingestion points: Tools such as lcm_grep, lcm_expand, and lcm_expand_query ingest data from a local SQLite database (lcm.db) containing prior conversation logs.
  • Boundary markers: None. The skill does not define delimiters or provide instructions to the agent to ignore potentially malicious instructions embedded in the retrieved historical context.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to write to the file system (externalized payloads), modify the SQLite database, and invoke an auxiliary LLM for synthesis.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of content sanitization or escaping of the historical data before it is re-interpolated into the agent's active context.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Sep 12, 2026, 06:50 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — hermes-lcm-context-management