hermesfusion-multi-model-panel
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 12, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs users to clone a repository from a personal GitHub account (
https://github.com/GiannoKlein9/HermesFusion.git) and install it viapip install -e ., which involves executing code from an unverified external source during installation. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The framework is designed to execute arbitrary shell commands defined in the
commandfield of theconfig.yamlfile (e.g.,hermes,ollama,openai, or custom Python scripts) usingsubprocess.runor similar mechanisms. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]:
- Ingestion points: The skill ingests untrusted data through the
--promptargument and--prompt-fileinputs defined inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The skill documentation does not mention the use of delimiters or escaping mechanisms when interpolating the
{prompt}placeholder into shell commands. - Capability inventory: The skill possesses significant capabilities, including the ability to execute shell commands with inherited environment variables (
passthrough_env: true), which could be exploited to exfiltrate API keys if a malicious prompt triggers a command injection. - Sanitization: While the skill defines some safety constraints like
max_prompt_bytesandallowed_roots_extrafor files, it lacks explicit documentation of sanitization for the interpolated prompt strings passed to the shell.
Audit Metadata