openclaw-executive-assistant-local
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 12, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONPERSISTENCEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process untrusted data from external sources, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection attacks.
- Ingestion points: Files placed in
code-along/01-data-intake-review/incoming/and.emlfiles incode-along/03-offline-communications-triage/eml/are read by the AI agent. - Boundary markers: The provided prompts do not include explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore potentially malicious embedded content within the source files.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses a hypothetical AI CLI tool to read these files and write markdown reports to local storage (
outputs/). - Sanitization: There is no evidence of content sanitization or validation before the data is processed by the LLM.
- [PERSISTENCE]: The documentation provides instructions for maintaining access and automated execution across sessions.
- Evidence: The skill includes examples of scheduling daily and weekly tasks using the system
cronfacility (e.g.,0 18 * * * cd ~/openclaw-assistant && ./generate-daily-log.sh). - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill uses override-style keywords to dictate agent behavior, which matches common prompt injection patterns.
- Evidence: The Troubleshooting section suggests using the prefix
CRITICAL: Output must be valid Markdown...to override potential formatting inconsistencies in the agent's output.
Audit Metadata