openclaw-executive-assistant-webinars

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 12, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPERSISTENCE
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process untrusted data from local directories, creating a significant attack surface for indirect instructions.
  • Ingestion points: The skill explicitly targets files in the incoming/ directory for 'Data Intake Review' and .eml files in the eml/ directory for 'Communications Triage'.
  • Boundary markers: The prompt templates (e.g., intake-review.md, email-triage.md) do not include delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the source data.
  • Capability inventory: The skill demonstrates workflows for reading files, executing CLI commands via openclaw, and writing report artifacts to the file system.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of content sanitization, filtering, or validation before the data is processed by the AI assistant.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs users to download external code from a non-verified personal repository during installation.
  • Evidence: git clone https://github.com/dandenney/webinars-build-your-own-executive-assistant-with-openclaw.git in the Installation section.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides patterns for executing shell commands and scripts on the local system.
  • Evidence: Documentation includes a shell script wrapper (generate-daily-log.sh) that invokes the openclaw CLI tool with arguments derived from local file content.
  • [PERSISTENCE]: The skill encourages the use of system scheduling tools to maintain automated workflows across sessions.
  • Evidence: The 'Automation example' section provides crontab configurations to periodically execute shell scripts that process local data.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 12, 2026, 06:50 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — openclaw-executive-assistant-webinars