openclaw-executive-assistant-webinars
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 12, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPERSISTENCE
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process untrusted data from local directories, creating a significant attack surface for indirect instructions.
- Ingestion points: The skill explicitly targets files in the
incoming/directory for 'Data Intake Review' and.emlfiles in theeml/directory for 'Communications Triage'. - Boundary markers: The prompt templates (e.g.,
intake-review.md,email-triage.md) do not include delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the source data. - Capability inventory: The skill demonstrates workflows for reading files, executing CLI commands via
openclaw, and writing report artifacts to the file system. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of content sanitization, filtering, or validation before the data is processed by the AI assistant.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs users to download external code from a non-verified personal repository during installation.
- Evidence:
git clone https://github.com/dandenney/webinars-build-your-own-executive-assistant-with-openclaw.gitin the Installation section. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides patterns for executing shell commands and scripts on the local system.
- Evidence: Documentation includes a shell script wrapper (
generate-daily-log.sh) that invokes theopenclawCLI tool with arguments derived from local file content. - [PERSISTENCE]: The skill encourages the use of system scheduling tools to maintain automated workflows across sessions.
- Evidence: The 'Automation example' section provides
crontabconfigurations to periodically execute shell scripts that process local data.
Audit Metadata