openclaw-videotranslate-skill
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 12, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs the user to clone and install code from a third-party repository (
https://github.com/zbjincheng/openclaw-skill-videotranslate.git), which introduces unverified code into the local environment. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The installation process involves downloading a remote repository and executing it via
pip install, creating a vector for remote code execution from an untrusted source. - [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The setup instructions recommend executing
sudo apt install ffmpeg, which requires administrative privileges on the host system. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill performs video and audio processing by executing shell commands through the FFmpeg utility.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: Subtitle text and audio data are transmitted to external service providers (e.g., OpenAI or custom API endpoints) for translation and Text-to-Speech synthesis.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted subtitle data from external files (
.srt,.vtt) and processes this content using LLM-based translation providers. - Ingestion points: Subtitle paths provided by the user or extracted from source videos as seen in
SKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The skill does not implement delimiters or safety instructions to prevent the LLM from obeying commands embedded within the subtitle text.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses the ability to execute subprocesses (FFmpeg) and perform outbound network requests to various API endpoints.
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of input validation or sanitization of the subtitle content before it is processed by the translation engine.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata