ai-content-pipeline-automation

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 29, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructions require cloning an external GitHub repository (github.com/pennydinh/marketing-pineline-share.git) and installing dependencies from public registries like npm or yarn. This introduces a dependency on external code that should be audited by the user.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes various terminal commands for setup and execution, including npm install, npm run dev, and npm run remotion:render. These commands execute local scripts and binary dependencies within the user's environment.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection due to its core functionality of crawling external, untrusted web sources (TechCrunch, Twitter/X, LinkedIn) and passing that content directly to LLMs for generation.
  • Ingestion points: The crawlNewsSource function retrieves data from external URLs which is then used as researchData in generateContent within SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: The provided examples do not include explicit prompt delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the research data.
  • Capability inventory: The skill environment contains high-value secrets (OpenAI, Anthropic, and AWS keys) and has the capability to perform network requests and write files to the disk (renderMedia).
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of the crawled content before it is interpolated into the AI generation prompts.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Jun 29, 2026, 01:55 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — ai-content-pipeline-automation