marketing-content-pipeline-automation
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 29, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection due to its automated content research functionality.
- Ingestion points: The
researchTopicfunction insrc/lib/research/crawler.tscrawls content from external, untrusted sources such as TechCrunch, Twitter, and LinkedIn. - Boundary markers: The instructions and code snippets lack specific delimiters or system instructions to the AI agent to ignore instructions embedded within the crawled research data.
- Capability inventory: The skill environment has capabilities to make external network requests (Facebook Graph API), perform file system operations (video rendering), and execute subprocesses (via Remotion's reliance on ffmpeg).
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of input validation, escaping, or filtering of the externally sourced content before it is interpolated into the prompts for Claude or OpenAI.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs the agent to clone a project repository from a public GitHub repository.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The documentation provides instructions for installing dependencies using package managers (npm, yarn, pnpm) and running a local development server.
Audit Metadata