anki-mcp-server-integration
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 16, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs the user to download and execute code from external sources:
- Downloads and runs the
@ankimcp/anki-mcp-serverpackage vianpx. - References binary
.mcpbbundles fromgithub.com/ankimcp/anki-mcp-server/releases. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Installation requires the execution of shell commands, including
npm install,npx, andngroksetup, which may run with the user's local permissions. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses a vulnerability surface for indirect prompt injection:
- Ingestion points: Processes card content (Front/Back fields), deck names, and tags from the local Anki database (e.g., via
get_due_cards,findNotes,notesInfo). - Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands are specified in the provided documentation.
- Capability inventory: Includes tool calls to delete notes (
deleteNotes), update card content (updateNoteFields), and read/write local media files (storeMediaFile,retrieveMediaFile). - Sanitization: No evidence of sanitization for ingested card content before processing by the LLM.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The
storeMediaFiletool allows the agent to read arbitrary local files by providing a file path to thedataargument (e.g.,data: "/Users/username/Downloads/diagram.png"). If an attacker provides a path to sensitive files (like SSH keys or configuration files), the agent could potentially read and 'store' them in Anki or send them over anngroktunnel if configured.
Audit Metadata