anki-mcp-server-integration

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 16, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs the user to download and execute code from external sources:
  • Downloads and runs the @ankimcp/anki-mcp-server package via npx.
  • References binary .mcpb bundles from github.com/ankimcp/anki-mcp-server/releases.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Installation requires the execution of shell commands, including npm install, npx, and ngrok setup, which may run with the user's local permissions.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses a vulnerability surface for indirect prompt injection:
  • Ingestion points: Processes card content (Front/Back fields), deck names, and tags from the local Anki database (e.g., via get_due_cards, findNotes, notesInfo).
  • Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands are specified in the provided documentation.
  • Capability inventory: Includes tool calls to delete notes (deleteNotes), update card content (updateNoteFields), and read/write local media files (storeMediaFile, retrieveMediaFile).
  • Sanitization: No evidence of sanitization for ingested card content before processing by the LLM.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The storeMediaFile tool allows the agent to read arbitrary local files by providing a file path to the data argument (e.g., data: "/Users/username/Downloads/diagram.png"). If an attacker provides a path to sensitive files (like SSH keys or configuration files), the agent could potentially read and 'store' them in Anki or send them over an ngrok tunnel if configured.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 16, 2026, 10:44 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — anki-mcp-server-integration