browser-mcp-control
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 16, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill facilitates the ingestion of data from external websites, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection attacks where malicious instructions on a webpage could override agent behavior.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent's context through
browser_snapshot(ARIA tree extraction) andbrowser_get_console_logs(SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: The skill documentation does not provide instructions for using delimiters or boundary markers to separate ingested content from system instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses powerful capabilities to interact with the browser environment based on model output, including
browser_navigate,browser_click,browser_type,browser_press_key, andbrowser_screenshot(SKILL.md). - Sanitization: There is no indication of sanitization, filtering, or validation of the web content before it is presented to the model.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The installation process requires downloading source code from a third-party GitHub repository that is not part of the trusted vendor list.
- Evidence: Installation instructions in
SKILL.mddirect users to executegit clone https://github.com/BrowserMCP/mcp.gitfollowed bynpm installandnpm run build.
Audit Metadata