cheatengine-mcp-bridge
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 16, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill exposes multiple tools that allow for arbitrary code execution within the context of target processes.
- The
inject_dlltool allows the agent to load and execute external libraries into a running process via a provided file path. - The
execute_codetool enables the execution of raw assembly or machine code strings at specific memory addresses. - The
auto_assembletool permits the agent to write and execute scripts that can hook functions, allocate memory, and modify program logic. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The configuration section explicitly mentions an environment variable
CE_MCP_ALLOW_SHELL. When set to1, this allows for arbitrary shell command execution, which is noted as dangerous. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill provides comprehensive tools for reading arbitrary process memory, including
read_memory,read_string, andread_pointer_chain. This capability can be used to harvest sensitive information (credentials, session tokens, personal data) from other applications running on the system. Thesave_tabletool further enables writing this data to the local filesystem. - [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The skill instructions encourage the use of Cheat Engine's DBVM (Ring -1 hypervisor) for advanced debugging and anti-cheat evasion. This grants the agent access to system-level debugging capabilities that operate below the operating system's standard security controls.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill facilitates runtime code generation and execution through the
auto_assembleandexecute_codetools, which compile and run machine code within target processes dynamically. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process unstructured data from external processes, which could contain malicious instructions.
- Ingestion points: Tools such as
read_string,read_memory,disassemble, andget_rtti_classnamefetch data from target process memory into the agent's context. - Capability inventory: The skill possesses high-impact capabilities including
write_memory,execute_code,inject_dll, andsave_table(documented in SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: There are no documented boundary markers or instructions to the agent to ignore potentially malicious content found within the memory it reads.
- Sanitization: The skill does not describe any sanitization or validation of the memory contents before they are interpreted by the AI agent.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata