figma-mcp-go
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 16, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The installation process requires downloading a Figma plugin ZIP file from a personal GitHub repository releases page (
https://github.com/vkhanhqui/figma-mcp-go/releases). - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs users to install and run the server using
npx -y @vkhanhqui/figma-mcp-go@latest, which involves downloading and executing code from the NPM registry provided by an unverified third-party developer. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill's operational model relies on executing external commands via
npxto start the MCP server, granting the skill execution capabilities on the host system. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: Tools like
save_screenshotsandexport_frames_to_pdfallow the agent to write data (images and PDFs) to arbitrary local file system paths via theoutputDirandoutputPatharguments. This capability could be used to write data to sensitive locations or overwrite existing files. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill reads text content from Figma files via tools like
get_design_contextandscan_text_nodes. If these Figma documents contain malicious instructions, the agent could potentially be manipulated into misusing its file-writing capabilities. - Ingestion points: Figma node properties and text content retrieved from files using
get_design_context,scan_text_nodes, andget_node(SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: None. The skill does not implement delimiters or specific warnings to ignore instructions found within the design data.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to write to the local file system (
save_screenshots,export_frames_to_pdf) and modify live Figma designs. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of input validation or sanitization for the text data retrieved from the design files before it is processed by the agent.
Audit Metadata