godot-mcp-pro-integration
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 16, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The installation process requires cloning a plugin from a third-party GitHub repository (github.com/youichi-uda/godot-mcp-pro) and acquiring a server package from external platforms including itch.io and Buy Me a Coffee.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Users are instructed to execute manual shell commands, such as
git clone,npm install, andnpm run build, to set up the environment using code from unverified external sources. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill defines tools like
execute_editor_scriptandexecute_game_scriptwhich allow the AI agent to generate and run arbitrary GDScript code at runtime within the Godot Editor or game instance. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exposes the AI agent to untrusted project data, creating a risk of indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Data is ingested into the agent context through tools like
read_script,get_output_log,get_filesystem_tree, andsearch_in_filesfound in SKILL.md. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit markers or instructions to delimit or sanitize data read from project files to prevent the execution of embedded malicious instructions.
- Capability inventory: The agent possesses significant capabilities including file system modifications (
create_script,edit_script,save_scene) and high-privilege code execution (execute_editor_script). - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation mechanisms are described for the content ingested from the local development environment.
Audit Metadata