google-surf-mcp-search
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 16, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's primary function is to ingest untrusted content from the public web and PDF documents, creating a high surface area for indirect prompt injection. An attacker could host malicious content that, when searched or extracted, attempts to override the agent's instructions.
- Ingestion points:
search,search_parallel,extract, andsearch_extracttools inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: None mentioned or enforced in the skill definition.
- Capability inventory: Web search and extraction of HTML/PDF content into the agent's context.
- Sanitization: Uses Readability for HTML and unpdf for PDFs, which may clean the format but does not sanitize malicious natural language instructions.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The installation instructions require running
npx google-surf-mcpor cloninghttps://github.com/HarimxChoi/google-surf-mcp. This repository and package are hosted by a third-party account not included in the trusted vendor list for this author context. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The configuration variable
SURF_ALLOW_PRIVATE=trueenables the browser to access private IP addresses. This creates a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) risk, where a malicious prompt or website could trick the agent into probing or extracting data from internal network services. - [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The environment variable
SURF_NO_SANDBOX=trueallows the agent to run the browser without its security sandbox. This significantly increases the risk that a browser-level exploit triggered by a malicious website could escape to the host system.
Audit Metadata