homeassistant-mcp-server
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 16, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from external sources (Home Assistant device states, logbook entries, and history) which can influence the agent's behavior.
- Ingestion points: Data is pulled into the agent context via tools such as
states_control,history_query,logbook_query,error_log_get, andcalendar_accessinSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The instructions lack explicit boundary markers or warnings to ignore instructions embedded within the Home Assistant data.
- Capability inventory: The skill provides powerful tools such as
call_service(generic service execution),template_render(Jinja2 evaluation),camera_control, andlock_control. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization for data interpolated into the
template_rendertool or passed to service calls. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill provides a tool (
template_render) that executes Jinja2 templates provided at runtime. - Evidence: The
template_rendertool inSKILL.mdallows the execution of arbitrary Jinja2 logic, which could be exploited if combined with untrusted data retrieved from device states or attributes. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructions direct the user to download and install external code from public sources.
- Evidence: The
Installationsection inSKILL.mdinstructs users to install thehomeassistant-mcppackage from PyPI and provides commands to clone the source code fromhttps://github.com/robbrad/homeassistant-mcp.git.
Audit Metadata