lanhu-mcp-collaboration

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 16, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFE
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill documentation encourages users and AI assistants to clone and install code from an untrusted GitHub repository (https://github.com/dsphper/lanhu-mcp.git).
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The installation process involves executing shell scripts (bash setup-env.sh, bash easy-install.sh) and installing dependencies (pip install -r requirements.txt) from the downloaded repository, which constitutes arbitrary code execution from an unverified source.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses a surface for indirect prompt injection by ingesting and analyzing content from external Lanhu design prototypes.
  • Ingestion points: The analyze_requirements_document and view_design_document tools ingest text and data from external lanhuapp.com URLs (SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify any delimiters or warnings to ignore instructions that might be embedded within the design documents or prototypes.
  • Capability inventory: The skill can perform file system writes through export_design_slices and network operations to Lanhu and Feishu APIs via create_message.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering for the content extracted from design documents before it is processed by the AI.
  • [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill requires the use of a sensitive session cookie (LANHU_COOKIE) and a webhook URL (FEISHU_WEBHOOK_URL). While the documentation recommends environment variables for storage, these credentials provide direct access to the user's Lanhu account and team communication channels.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Sep 16, 2026, 10:43 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — lanhu-mcp-collaboration