lanhu-mcp-collaboration
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 16, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFE
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill documentation encourages users and AI assistants to clone and install code from an untrusted GitHub repository (
https://github.com/dsphper/lanhu-mcp.git). - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The installation process involves executing shell scripts (
bash setup-env.sh,bash easy-install.sh) and installing dependencies (pip install -r requirements.txt) from the downloaded repository, which constitutes arbitrary code execution from an unverified source. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses a surface for indirect prompt injection by ingesting and analyzing content from external Lanhu design prototypes.
- Ingestion points: The
analyze_requirements_documentandview_design_documenttools ingest text and data from externallanhuapp.comURLs (SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify any delimiters or warnings to ignore instructions that might be embedded within the design documents or prototypes.
- Capability inventory: The skill can perform file system writes through
export_design_slicesand network operations to Lanhu and Feishu APIs viacreate_message. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering for the content extracted from design documents before it is processed by the AI.
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill requires the use of a sensitive session cookie (
LANHU_COOKIE) and a webhook URL (FEISHU_WEBHOOK_URL). While the documentation recommends environment variables for storage, these credentials provide direct access to the user's Lanhu account and team communication channels.
Audit Metadata