local-mcp-file-editing
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 16, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill provides instructions to download, build, and run software from an untrusted GitHub repository (
https://github.com/nakasyou/local-mcp.git). This introduces a supply-chain risk as the external source is not verified. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill defines several tools that allow an AI agent to execute arbitrary shell commands on the host system. While it mentions sandboxing (Landlock/Seatbelt), it explicitly provides a
without_sandboxtool and a/permissions yolomode that allows the agent to execute commands with full network and host permissions, bypassing security controls. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill creates a high-risk surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: The agent can read local files and list directories using
read_fileandlist_directory(SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: There are no instructions or markers to help the agent distinguish between its own instructions and potentially malicious content within the files it reads.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the power to write files (
write_file), execute shell commands (execute), and access the network (without_sandbox). - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of file content is mentioned before processing.
- [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The documentation includes instructions for using
sudoto install system dependencies (bubblewrap) and move binaries to system paths (/usr/local/bin/). If an agent is tricked into suggesting or executing these commands, it could lead to unauthorized privilege escalation on the host.
Audit Metadata