postgres-mcp-server
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 16, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs the user to download and execute code from a third-party GitHub repository (
ericzakariasson/pg-mcp-server.git) and via thenpx pg-mcp-servercommand. These sources are not verified or managed by a trusted organization. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Through the
querytool, the skill provides a mechanism for the agent to execute arbitrary SQL queries. This creates a significant attack surface where an agent could be manipulated into performing unintended database operations. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill includes an optional configuration
DANGEROUSLY_ALLOW_WRITE_OPS. If enabled, this grants the agent the ability to modify or delete data within the database (INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE), increasing the risk of data loss or corruption via agent manipulation. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill retrieves data from an external database and injects it into the agent's context, creating a vulnerability to indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Data retrieved from database rows and schema information via the
querytool andpostgres://resources are fed directly into the LLM context. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define boundary markers or provide safety guidelines to help the agent distinguish between data and instructions within the query results.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses full read capabilities and optional write capabilities for the connected database.
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of the database content before it is processed by the LLM.
Audit Metadata