zabbix-mcp-server
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 16, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill's primary installation method utilizes
uvxto fetch and execute code directly from a remote, unverified GitHub repository (github.com/mpeirone/zabbix-mcp-server). This pattern executes arbitrary remote code on the user's machine during setup. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: In addition to the
uvxexecution, the documentation provides instructions togit clonethe repository for local installation and Docker deployment, which involves downloading unverified scripts and configuration files. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill acts as a bridge to Zabbix APIs, ingesting potentially untrusted data such as trigger descriptions, item values, and host metadata. This data is placed directly into the agent's context without documented boundary markers or sanitization, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection attacks.
- Ingestion points: Monitoring data retrieved via the
zabbix_apitool (e.g., host names, trigger descriptions, problem logs). - Boundary markers: None specified in the instructions to prevent the agent from obeying instructions embedded in monitoring data.
- Capability inventory: The
zabbix_apitool has high-privilege capabilities, including the ability to create, update, and delete Zabbix resources (unless restricted by environment variables). - Sanitization: No evidence of sanitization or filtering of API responses before they are processed by the AI agent.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata