android-studio-pentest-environment
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 18, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONPERSISTENCEDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches tools, binaries, and Android modules from various third-party GitHub and GitLab repositories.
- Downloads the
rootAVDtoolkit fromgitlab.com/newbitto automate the rooting process. - Downloads Magisk (
topjohnwu/Magisk), Frida server (frida/frida), LSPosed (LSPosed/LSPosed), and several SSL pinning bypass modules (Dr-TSNG,ViRb3,Fuzion24) from GitHub. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: Encourages the execution of community-contributed scripts directly from the Frida CodeShare repository.
- Instruction:
frida -U -f com.example.app --codeshare akabe1/frida-multiple-unpinningfetches and executes code from a remote service. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Instructs the user to execute shell scripts and system utilities with high-level access.
- Execution of
./rootAVD.shafter cloning an external repository. - Heavy use of
adbcommands to push files, modify permissions (chmod 755), and interact with the system shell. - [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: Provides instructions to gain administrative (root) access to the emulator environment.
- Uses
adb rootandadb remountto grant full control over the file system. - Employs the
-writable-systemflag during emulator startup to allow modifications to protected partitions. - [PERSISTENCE]: Establishes persistent modifications that remain active across reboots.
- Installs custom CA certificates into the system root store at
/system/etc/security/cacerts/. - Installs Magisk and LSPosed modules that integrate into the boot process and zygote process of the Android OS.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: Leverages dynamic instrumentation to intercept and modify application logic at runtime.
- Uses Frida to hook Java methods for bypassing security checks such as root detection (
RootBeer.isRooted) and SSL pinning. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has an attack surface where instructions could be embedded in the data processed by the agent.
- Ingestion points: The agent processes external package names, Frida script paths, and potentially application metadata during analysis (e.g., in
SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: No delimiters or safety warnings are present to distinguish instructions from the application data being analyzed.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses capabilities to execute shell commands (
adb), write to the file system (adb push), and perform network operations (curl,pip). - Sanitization: There is no evidence of input validation or sanitization for application identifiers or script content before they are used in commands.
Audit Metadata