android-studio-pentest-environment

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 18, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONPERSISTENCEDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches tools, binaries, and Android modules from various third-party GitHub and GitLab repositories.
  • Downloads the rootAVD toolkit from gitlab.com/newbit to automate the rooting process.
  • Downloads Magisk (topjohnwu/Magisk), Frida server (frida/frida), LSPosed (LSPosed/LSPosed), and several SSL pinning bypass modules (Dr-TSNG, ViRb3, Fuzion24) from GitHub.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: Encourages the execution of community-contributed scripts directly from the Frida CodeShare repository.
  • Instruction: frida -U -f com.example.app --codeshare akabe1/frida-multiple-unpinning fetches and executes code from a remote service.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Instructs the user to execute shell scripts and system utilities with high-level access.
  • Execution of ./rootAVD.sh after cloning an external repository.
  • Heavy use of adb commands to push files, modify permissions (chmod 755), and interact with the system shell.
  • [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: Provides instructions to gain administrative (root) access to the emulator environment.
  • Uses adb root and adb remount to grant full control over the file system.
  • Employs the -writable-system flag during emulator startup to allow modifications to protected partitions.
  • [PERSISTENCE]: Establishes persistent modifications that remain active across reboots.
  • Installs custom CA certificates into the system root store at /system/etc/security/cacerts/.
  • Installs Magisk and LSPosed modules that integrate into the boot process and zygote process of the Android OS.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: Leverages dynamic instrumentation to intercept and modify application logic at runtime.
  • Uses Frida to hook Java methods for bypassing security checks such as root detection (RootBeer.isRooted) and SSL pinning.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has an attack surface where instructions could be embedded in the data processed by the agent.
  • Ingestion points: The agent processes external package names, Frida script paths, and potentially application metadata during analysis (e.g., in SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: No delimiters or safety warnings are present to distinguish instructions from the application data being analyzed.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses capabilities to execute shell commands (adb), write to the file system (adb push), and perform network operations (curl, pip).
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of input validation or sanitization for application identifiers or script content before they are used in commands.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Sep 18, 2026, 05:07 PM