esaa-security-audit
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 18, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The installation instructions direct users to clone a repository from an external source (
github.com/elzobrito/ESAA-Security.git) which is not categorized as a trusted organization or well-known service. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the user to clone an external repository and then execute Python scripts from within that repository (
python orchestrator.py). This sequence constitutes the download and execution of code from an unverified remote source. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to process untrusted code from a target repository (
AUDIT_TARGET_REPO) for security analysis. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection where instructions embedded in the audited code could influence the agent's behavior. - Ingestion points: Files within the user-specified
AUDIT_TARGET_REPO(e.g.,.py,.js,.java,.java). - Boundary markers: The documentation references schema-validated outputs and evidence requirements, which serve as boundary controls.
- Capability inventory: The agent requires file read access to the target repository, write access to a
reports/directory, and the ability to execute security checks. - Sanitization: The skill identifies "user_input_sanitization" and "schema-validated outputs" as internal mechanisms for maintaining audit hygiene.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata